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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation of the State of Utah,
Appellant and Plaintiff,
- vs. TOWNE HOUSE ATHLETIC
CLUB and THE UNIVERSITY
CLUB,
Respondents and Defendants.

Case No.
10640

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought an action in the District Court
of Salt Lake County to collect a restaurant license
foe from the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT
Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment
was g1·anted in part, and the Complaint of the plaintiff was dismissed. The court held that the state
had not pre-empted to itself the right to license and
regulate the defendants but dismissed plaintiff's
Complaint because it had failed to enact a proper
ordinance to license and regulate the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of that portion of
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the judgment of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants seek reversal of that
portion of the judgment wherein the court held that
the state of Utah had not pre-empted to itself the
right to license and regulate these defendants for
the reason that it is clear as a matter of law from
the statutes that the plaintiff has no right to licensP,
charge a license fee or regulate the defendants. Tht'
defendants request this court to direct the lower
court to enter its order decreeing that the plaintiff
does not have a right to license, charge a license fee
or regulate the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A stipulation of facts involved in this case was
entered into between the plaintiff and defendants on
the 18th day of November, 1965 (R9) and has been
quoted in full in plaintiff's Statement of Facts and
defendants agree with the plaintiff's Statement of
the Facts wherein it sets forth this stipulation.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
BELOW, DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF MAY
NOT IMPOSE A RESTAURANT LICENSE AND
CHARGE A LICENSE FEE UPON THE DEFENDANTS
WHO ARE PRIVATE, NON-PROFIT INCORPORATED
SOCIAL CLUBS IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUS·
TAINED.

The plaintiff seeks to impose a restaurant fee
on the defendants and relies upon the following state
statutes for its authority:
2

Section 10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
~1:; amended which empowers the city to license, tax
and l'egulate ... boarding houses, restaurants, eating
houses; ...
Sedion 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended which grants to cities the right to raise
rr,·enue by levying and collecting a license fee or
tax on any business within the limits of the city;
and ... (Emphasis ours)

Section 10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, states as follows:

"They may regulate all social clubs, recreational associations, athletic associations and
kindred associations, whether incorporated or
not, which maintain club rooms or regular
meeting rooms within the corporate limits of
the city"
The city ordinance upon which plaintiff relies
is Section 20-2-62 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, 1955, which ordinance imposes a license
fee on restaurants. The ordinance defines the term
"restaurant" as being any place where food or drink
is prepared, served, or offered for sale or sold for
human consumption on or off the premises. The
Utah State Statute from which the city derives its
authority to enact such an ordinance does not define
the term "restaurant."
Since the Legislature did not define this term,
we must look to case law to determine what in the
absence of legislative definition, constitutes a "res3

taurant." The case law on the subject has been sum
marized in an opinion by the Salt Lake City Attornev
dated December 18, 1958. The author of that opini~ 1;
came to the following conclusion:
"An examination of the cases defining
'restaurant leads one to the conclusion that
it is such an establishment as ordinarily serves
meals and drinks to the public generally. An
Illinois case, H olzen v. Chicago, 22 Ill. App.
50, 136 N.E. 594, quotes from Webster's definition of a restaurant as 'an establishment
where refreshments or meals may be procured
by the public; a public eating house.' Other
cases so holding are Jackson v. Lane, 142 N.J.
Eq. 193, 59 A.2d 662; Donahue v. Conant, 102
Vt. 108, 146 A. 417; Food Corporation v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Phikidelphia, 384 Pa. 288, 121 A.2d 94; City of
Flordell Hills v. Herdekopf, Mo. App., 271
S."\V. 2d 256; San Francisco v. Larson, 166
Cal. 179, 131 Pac. 366. And it has been said to
mean where any person who conducts himself
properly and is able and willing to pay for
same 'has a right to demand that food be furnished him.' (Emphasis Added.) Debenham
v. Short, Tex. Civ. App., 199 S.W. 1147. See
Annotation in 122 A.L.R. 1399."
With this conclusion, the defendants are in complete accord and this conclusion is substantiated by
several cases decided subsequent to the City Attorney's opinion defining "restaurant" as an establishment where refreshments or meals may be procured
by the public; meaning a public eating house. Drucker vs. Frisina, 210 N.Y.S. 2d, 680, 681, 31 Misc. 2d,
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13ased upon the cases above referred to, the
Salt Lake City Attorney, in his December 18, 1958
opinion, came to the conclusion that clubs, such as
tlH~ defendants, which provide meals to their members and guests only (which has been stipulated to
by the plaintiff) (R9) do not come within the generally accepted definition of "boarding house," "restaurant" and "eating house" as contained in Section
10-8-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Again we can agree with the opinion of the former
Salt Lake City Attorney. Therefore, the ordinance
under which Salt Lake City is attempting to license
the defendants cannot and does not apply to social
and athletic clubs which are not restaurants within
the purview of the statute creating the authorization
fol' the city to pass its restaurant ordinance.
This conclusion is further substantiated by the
fact that the Legislature has recognized in Section
10-8-81, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
that social clubs and athletic associations are unique
entities in and of themselves. The Legislature would
not have seen fit to provide that cities and towns
might regulate all social clubs, recreational associations, athletic associations, and kindred associations
if it were its intention to regulate them as restaurants or eating houses. If the Legislature had intended for the city to regulate each activity which
may be carried on within a social and athletic club,
5

then it would not have seen fit to empower cities
and towns to regulate the clubs in toto. To accept
the city's position, would be to allow the city to
circumvent the statute empowering it to regulate
social and athletic associations and compound thP
license and tax on the social and athletic associations
by allowing the city to license the clubs as restaurants, dance halls, bowling alleys, and shoe shine
shops, etc., which has been attempted by the city
in the past. The Legislature, however, understood
that social and athletic clubs present a unique situation since their operations encompass several types
of activities. The Legislature, therefore, provided
the cities with authority to regulate social clubs and
not dismember them into various parts. The Legislature did not authorize cities to regulate and license
each activity. In 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Third Edition, Section 26-39, it states as
follows:
"Power to impose a license tax upon a business does not authorize a division of the business into its constituant elements, parts or
incidents, and the levy of a separate tax on
each element, part or incident thereof. A
single taxable privilege may not be separate.cl
into its various component elements as ordinarily recognized, and a separate license tax
imposed on each element.... "
The Plaintiff has never seen fit to enact an
ordinance pursuant to the authority granted it under
Section 10-8-81 to regulate social clubs and athletic
6

ssoeiations and, therefore, cannot demand a license
fee in this case.
The case of American Fork City vs. Robinson,
et al, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249, deals with an ordinance enacted by the city of American Fork which
(L-fined clubs and club rooms and made it unlawful
rnr <~ny pel'Son to play billiards or pool in any club
room in the city. The defendants were tried and
c:nnvictecl of playing pool in the club room and
appealed to the Supreme Court. In its opinion this
Court stated:
"That the powers of the city are strictly lirni ted to those expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted, and to those
essential to the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, it is settled law in this
state. Salt Lake City vs. Sutter, 61 Utah,
533, 216 P. 234."
:1

"\Ve therefore look to the legislative grants
relied on to sustain the power to enact the
ordinance in question."
The Court reversed the convictions on the
ground that the power had not been given to the city
to enact such an ordinance. The laws of the State
of Utah had empowered city councils with the power
to "license, tax, regulate, and suppress billiard, pool,
bagatelle, pigeon hole, or any other tables or implements kept or used for similar purposes. * * *" The
laws of the State of Utah also granted powers to the
city councils to "regulate all social clubs, recreational
7

associations, athletic associations, and kindred asseiciations, whether incorporated or not, which main.
tain club rooms or regular meeting rooms within
the corporate limits of the city." The ordinance enacted, however, generally prohibited any person from
playing at billiards or pool upon any billiard or pool
table in any club room. This court therefore held
that the ordinance was not essential to the power
to regulate or suppress the keeping of such tables,
and that under the applicable strict rule of construction, the power of the city to enact the ordinance was
denied and the ordinance was held invalid.
The reverse situation is in existence in the case
presently before the Court. The city has been given
the power to enact an ordinance to regulate restaurants which it has done. However, these defendants
are not restaurants. They are social clubs and athletic associations. The powers have been given to
the cities to regulate some social clubs and athletic
associations, but the city has not exercised this power
and has not passed an ordinance pursuant to this
legislative authority. Counsel for the plaintiff refers
in his brief at page 7 to a "General Welfare Clause"
and states that these powers, if granted, are as a
rule designed to confer powers other than those
specifically mentioned. Certainly if the city has au·
thority to regulate these defendants, that power is
specifically stated and there is no need to refer to a
general welfare clause but there is a need to enact
proper ordinance to put this power into effect. The
8

pl::imtiff also contends that in order to protect the
public health, it is necessary for the city to have
authuri ty to license the defendants. These def endants certainly do not desire to create health hazards
and have no objections to being inspected and super\'ised. They are in fact regulated under bond by
rlw Utah Secretary of State. The question presented
to this Court is not whether there should be regulation of these defendants, but whether they should be
regulated by the Secretary of State. If the city has
the authority to regulate and license these defendants, then by passing the proper ordinance such a
purpose can be properly accomplished.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED TO
lTSELF THE POWER TO REGULATE OR LICENSE
THESE DEFENDANTS IS ERRONEOUS AND THE
COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED ITS JUDGMENT
DENYING TO THE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO LICENSE OR REGULATE THESE DEFENDANTS.

The State has pre-empted to itself the right to
regulate these defendants by virtue of Sections 16-613, 16-6-13.l, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3 and 16-6-14, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Under the terms
of these statutes the Secretary of State of the State
of Utah is charged with the duty to determine
whether any social club, recreational or .athletic association or kindred association incorporating under
the provisions of that chapter is a bona fide club or
association and whether the object of its existence
9

is for pecuniary profit. He is further charged 111
see th~t the clubs will ~ot ~e used for permitting ,
gamblmg or any other v10lation of law or ordinancl
and he is given the power to hold hearings for th::
purpose of determining whether a club or association
is operating in accordance with the law. The club.'
are also required by the statute to maintain a
$5,000.00 bond with the Secretary of State conditioned upon the faithful performance of their obligations. In addition, Section 6-6-13.1 sets forth in
specific detail fourteen different items which must
be included in the constitution, bylaws and/or house
rules of these non-profit social and athletic clubs.
These provisions range over the full gamut of operations of a social and athletic club and are not limited
to the narrow issue of the storage or consumption of
liquor on the premises.
Under Section 16-6-14 the specific authorization
is given to all police officers to have the right t11
enter the club rooms or meeting rooms of the social
clubs, recreation or athletic associations or kindred
associations incorporated under the provisions of the
chapter for the purpose of determining whether any
laws or ordinances are being violated therein. (Em·
phasis ours)
The sections of the Utah Code above referred to
are part of the Utah Non-Profit Corporation Act,
and create distinct and separate entities, known as
social clubs, recreation, or athletic associations in·
corporated as non-profit corporations which are reg·
10

ql;itC'<l hy the Secretary of State of the State of Utah.

The unique status of such entities was recognized by
the Legislature when it enacted Chapter 24, section 1
Laws of Utah 1959 which was entitled "An act pro\'iding for the licensing and regulation of establish!llrnts, associations, and corporations that allow
r'onsurnption and possession of liquor on their premieies; and providing a penalty for violation."
Section 11-10-1 of that act as codified states:
"Cities and towns within the corporate limits,
and counties outside of corporate cities and
towns shall license all establishments, associations and corporations, except non-profit corporatfo-ns bonded and regulated under provisions of sections 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2 and
16-6-13.3, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as enacted by Chapter 25, sections 2, 3, and 4, Laws
of Utah 1955 that operate a club, business or
association which allows the customers, members or guests to possess or consume liquor
on the premises, provided the license does not
permit the licensee, operator or employee of
either to hold, store, or possess liquor on the
premises. However, nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent persons other
than the licensee, operator or employees of
either, from possessing and consuming, but
not storing, liquor on premises, except as
otherwise provided for by statute." (Emphasis ours.)
From the foregoing it is clear to see that the
authority of the cities and towns and counties outside
of cities and towns shall license all establishments,
associations and corporations except non-profit cor11

porations bonded arid reg·ulated under the provisions
of Sections 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2 and 16-6-13.3. These
statutes which were enacted subsequently to Sec.
10-8-81 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
circumscribe and limit the authority of cities ancl
towns to license associations and corporations and
specifically state that cities cannot license athletic
clubs and social clubs, recreational or athletic associations, or kindred associations, which are n011 _
profit corporations bonded and regulated by the
Secretary of State. The concern which the city expresses over the health problem can certainly be
taken care of since the Secretary of State and police
officers are given the authority to determine whether ,
any ordinances of the cities where these clubs arr
located are being violated and can revoke their licens~
for such violation and this authority is not given to
the cities and towns but is specifically reserved to
the Secretary of State. These defendants should not
be required to be regulated by two masters nor to
pay license fees or taxes for services of inspection
done by the city when they are paying them to the
Secretary of State, who by law is required to regulate them. If the city feels that it should regulate ,
these defendants, its recourse is to the legislature ·
and not to the court.
1

CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court, dismissing the
plaintiff's Complaint, should be affirmed. Insofar,
12

li\iwever, as the decision of the lower court held that
the state has not pre-empted to itself the right to
license and regulate the defendants it is in error and
should be reversed and remanded with instructions
to the court to enter judgment denying to the plaintiff any right to license or charge a license fee or
rPgulate the defendants for any purpose whatsoever.

Respectfully submitted.
GEORGE J. ROMNEY
Suite 604 - 315 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Respondents-Defendants.
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